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L JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Town of Alta, Utah ("Alta") andMSICO, L.L.C. ("MSICO" and collectively with 
Alta, the "Appellees") adopt the jurisdictional statement set out in the Brief of Appellant. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW, STANDARDS 
OF REVIEW, AND PRESERVATION BELOW 
The following issues are presented for this Court's review: 
1. Did the District Court correctly rule in summary judgment proceedings that, as 
urged by MSICO, an amended plat of the Sugarplum Planned Unit Development 
("Sugarplum")1, which was recorded before the appellant acquired New Lot 8, amended the 
Sugarplum "Master Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions" (the "CC&Rs") 
so as to extinguish any designation of New Lot 5 as the site of a "parking facility" for the 
benefit of New Lot 8? 
A grant of summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and. . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah 
R. Civ. P. 56(c). When reviewing a District Court's decision to grant summary judgment, the 
1
 The Sugarplum PUD comprises nine developable lots, numbered 1-9, and Lot A, 
Sugarplum's common area. All references to "Lot" in this Brief are to one or more of 
these parcels. At the heart of the issue presented to the District Court and this Court 
concerning Lots 5 and 8 are questions about the effects an amendment to the original plat 
(the "Plat") of Sugarplum had on the bundle of rights granted to the respective owner of 
each of these Lots. Accordingly, where required for clarity of presentation, each reference 
to "Lot" is further qualified by either the term "Old," to indicate a Lot whose location and 
boundaries are defined by the Plat, or by the term "New," to indicate a Lot whose 
location and boundaries are defined by the amended Sugarplum plat (the "Amended 
Plat"). 
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Utah appellate courts examine the District Court's legal conclusions for correctness." Tustian 
v. Schriever, 2001 UT 84, P13, 34 P.3d 755. However, an appellate court may affirm the 
judgment appealed from "if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the 
record, even though such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be the 
basis of its ruling or action, and this is true even though such ground or theory is not urged 
or argued on appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and was not considered 
or passed on by the lower court." Dipomav. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, % 18, 29 P.3d 1225, 1230. 
2. Did the District Court correctly rule in summary judgment proceedings that, 
as urged by MSICO and Alta, 
(a) there was no easement or permanent dedication of New Lot 9 for 
disposal of excess snow removed from New Lot 8, where the key writing used provisional, 
temporary language; 
(b) Alta did not effect a taking of New Lot 8 by approving a snow storage 
plan that obviated the temporary use of Lot 9 as a storage site for excess snow removed from 
other Sugarplum Lots and still allowed for full use of all the View's units; and 
(c) the appellant did not change positions based on, or reasonably rely on, 
the past use of Lot 9 as a snow disposal site so as to estop the Town of Alta or MSICO from 
terminating that use as of December 2000? 
The District Court resolved these questions in favor of MSICO and Alta, granting 
MSICO's cross-motion for summary judgment on the appellant's claims to a snow storage 
right on New Lot 9. 
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A grant of summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and. . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah 
R.Civ.P.56(c). When reviewing a District Court's decision to grant summary judgment, the 
Utah appellate courts examine the District Court's legal conclusions for correctness." Tustian 
v. Schriever, 2001 UT 84, [^13, 34 P.3d 755. However, an appellate court may affirm the 
judgment appealed from "if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the 
record, even though such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be the 
basis of its ruling or action, and this is true even though such ground or theory is not urged 
or argued on appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and was not considered 
or passed on by the lower court." Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, If 18, 29 P.3d 1225, 1230. 
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of 
Proceedings, and Disposition Below 
This case involves a land use dispute between neighboring lot owners in a planned 
unit development in Little Cottonwood Canyon. As depicted in the photograph (R. 223.) at 
Exhibit 1 of the Addendum, the parcels at issue in the case are in Alta, very near the ski runs 
of the Snowbird ski area. The plaintiff appeals from the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Alta and MSICO on two matters: (1) MSICO's right to develop New 
Lot 5 without interference from the appellant and (2) the absence of any legal obligation on 
the part of Alta to protect the appellant's use of MSICO's Lot 9 as a dump for excess snow 
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removal from new Lot 8.2 
The appellant styles itself as the owners' association for "The View," a condominium 
located on New Lot 8 ("The View Condominium"). That self-designation is misleading and 
the subject of one of the arguments set out in this Brief. But for the purposes of specifically 
identifying the appellant and to continue the use of a designation applied to it in the District 
Court, the Appellees will refer to the appellant as the " View"throughout the remainder of this 
Brief. 
The View brought this lawsuit to assert, among other claims not preserved on appeal, 
that MSICO was obligated under the CC&Rs to allow the construction of a parking 
"facility"on New Lot 5 for the benefit of The View Condominium's residents and that Alta 
was bound by contract and on equitable grounds to allow The View Condominium's 
residents to use MSICO's New Lot 9 as a storage site for excess snow removed from the 
View's adjacent New Lot 8. 
On January 3, 2002, the View moved for summary judgment to enjoin MSICO from 
developing New Lot 5 in any way that would interfere with its asserted right to that parcel 
as a site for a parking structure. (R.290-92.)3 MSICO and Alta cross-motioned for summary 
2
 This property is not a stranger to the courts, see, e.g., Sweetwater Properties, Inc. 
v. Town of Alta, 622 P.2d 1178 (Utah 1981). 
3
 The claim on which the View sought summary judgment most closely 
corresponds to the Second Cause of Action in its Complaint. There the View alleged that 
MSICO breached a provision of the CC&Rs reserving Old Lot 5 for the construction of a 
parking structure for residents of The View Condominium. The Second Cause of Action 
also asserted that MSICO had breached the terms of an easement in favor of Old Lot 8 
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judgment, seeking dismissal of the View's claims to a parking right on New Lot 5 and 
summary judgment on the View's claim of entitlement to use New Lot 9 as a snow storage 
area in perpetuity. (R.332-35). Alta moved for summary judgment disposing of the View's 
claims of governmental taking without just compensation. 
The District Court granted the Appellees' cross-motion for summary judgment 
dismissing the View's claim that the CC&Rs reserved New Lot 5 as the site for a parking 
structure for the use of the View. The Court also ruled that all the View's remaining causes 
of action, insofar as they pertained to New Lot 5 or Lot 9, were dismissed on the merits and 
with prejudice. (R. 592.) 
B. Statement of Facts Relevant to 
the Issues Presented for Review 
1. Facts Relevant to the View's Claim 
To A Parking Right On New Lot 5 
1. The Plat was recorded on August 12, 1983. Referred to as the "Map" in the 
CC&Rs, the Plat reserved the right of Sorenson Resources Company ("SRC"), as 
Sugarplum's owner and developer, to change the location, boundaries, and dimensions of 
each Old Lot and to change the number of residential units (sometimes referred to as the 
"unit density) permitted on each Old Lot. 
2. The Plat is incorporated in the CC&Rs by express reference. (R. 367). 
3. The CC&Rs were recorded on August 17,1983, five days after the recording 
across Old Lot 4. This latter component of the Second Cause of Action was not argued in 
the View's motion for summary judgment and is not before this Court on appeal. 
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of the Plat. (R. 359). 
4. On November 26, 1984, more than a year after the Plat and CC&Rs were 
recorded, SRC recorded the Amended Plat which had previously been approved by Alta and 
that cross-references the CC&Rs. (R. 420). 
5. SRC prepared the Amended Plat to reflect and implement its decision in 1984 
to modify the entire configuration of lots, phases and architectural scheme of Sugarplum. 
(R. 430). 
6. The Amended Plat changed the location, orientation, or boundaries of all nine 
Old Lots4 and modified the unit density of New Lots 3 through 9. Specifically, the Amended 
Plat 
(a) changed the location and orientation of New Lot 5 to allow the 
development there, in conjunction with New Lot 4, of up to 65 residential units; (R. 422.) 
(b) withdrew Old Lot 5's designation as a site for "parking and commercial 
development of the Air Space" (R. 428, pp. 16-17.); 
(c) changed the location and orientation of New Lot 8 to allow the 
development there, in conjunction with New Lot 9, of up to 60 residential units (R. 420.); 
and 
(d) changed the location and orientation of New Lot 6 to allow the 
4
 For the reference of the Court, a copy of the Appellees' Overlay Exhibit (R.422), 
showing the boundaries and location of the Old Lots (in black) and the New Lots (in red) 
is inserted in the body of this Brief immediately behind this page. 
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development there, in conjunction with New Lot 7, of up to 40 residential units (R. 420.). 
7. SRC intended that the Amended Plat's designation of each New Lot's 
respective location, orientation, use, and developable unit density would supersede the 
corresponding designation in the Plat, (R. 430), and thereby amend the related provisions of 
the CC&Rs. 
8. SRC conveyed New Lot 8 to the View Associations Ltd. (The "Partnership") 
by Special Warranty Deed dated January 4, 1985, less than two months after the Amended 
Plat was recorded. (R.417-18.) 
9. SRC never intended that the New Lot 8 sale transaction impose a restrictive 
covenant on, or convey an easement over, New Lot 5 for the benefit of New Lot 8. (R. 429, 
p.21.) The View never challenged the credibility of Mr. Plumb or Mr. Watts who provided 
testimony on this subject. 
10. MSICO purchased New Lots 4, 5, and 9 from Sorenson Development, Inc., a 
successor in title to SRC, by Special Warranty Deed dated December 31, 1988, more than 
four years after the Amended Plat modified the CC&Rs. (R. 233-35.) 
11. As of December 31, 1988, the location, orientation, boundaries, use, and 
designated unit densities of New Lots 4, 5, and 9 were those specified in the Amended Plat. 
12. MSICO has developed New Lots 4, 5, and 9 consistently with the terms of its 
November 9, 2000 "Definitive Settlement and Development Agreement" (the "Definitive 
Agreement") with Alta. (R. 437-48.) 
13. The CC&Rs, on which View relies for its "parking right," expressly allow 
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development of New Lot 5 for residential use. (R. 420.) 
2. Facts Relevant to the View's Claim 
To Use New Lot 9 As A Snow Dump 
14. There is no evidence in the Record of a dedication or easement, whether 
recorded or not, declaring or setting aside New Lot 9 as a site for the disposal of excess snow 
or connecting either Old Lot 9 or New Lot 9 to the Sugarplum common area for the use of 
all Sugarplum residents. 
15. By letter dated February 27, 1985, and prior to the sale of any Lots, SRC 
advised Alta that during the development of New Lots 6 and 8, excess snow may be stored 
on New Lot 9, but that snow storage areas were subject to change so as to utilize available 
alternatives such as Snowbird property and the Bypass Road. (R. 430). 
16. SRC always intended the use of New Lot 9 as a snow storage site to be 
temporary because New Lot 9 was a valuable, buildable Lot. ( R.430). The View never 
challenged Mr. Plumb's credibility on this point. 
17. The Record contains no evidence that the development of New Lot 8 was 
impeded or limited in any way, that New Lot 8 was rendered undevelopable to any extent, 
or that the sale of any unit in The View Condominium, which is located on New Lot 8, was 
lost due to the absence of a permanent designation of New Lot 9 as a snow storage site by 
easement, contract or otherwise. 
18. In connection with the Definitive Agreement, Alta approved a snow removal 
and storage plan that MISCO submitted for New Lots 4, 5, and 9 that also provided a snow 
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removal and storage plan for New Lot 8 that did not require the use of New Lot 9. 
19. In the Definitive Agreement, a definitive snow removal and storage plan was 
approved by Alta that largely eliminated the use of New Lot 9 as a snow depository site. The 
new snow storage plan for New Lots 4, 5, 8, and 9 provided for the shifting of snow to other 
locations and mandated the use of heated driveways on specified building pads. 
Accordingly, Alta acknowledged that SRC's February 27, 1985 letter designating New Lot 
9 as a temporary snow storage site would be of no further effect. (R. 441, §2.4.) 
3. Facts Relevant To Matters Not Raised Below But 
Relevant To A Proper Disposition Of This Appeal 
20. The View Condominium Owners Association, which the View purports to be, 
was involuntarily dissolved in or about March 1988 pursuant to the Utah Business 
Corporation Act and was never reinstated. Accordingly, the standing of the View to pursue 
any legal action in the District Court appears questionable. Addendum, Exhibit 2. 
21. The January 21, 1986 "Declaration of Condominium of The View 
Condominium Project" (the "View Declaration") which created The View Condominium 
project and established the View Condominium Owners Association, reflects the dedication 
of a "perpetual easement and right of way for a parking area and/or parking structure" on 
property that straddles the boundary between New Lot 6 and the Sugarplum common area. 
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IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. With Respect To The View's Claim 
To A Parking Right On New Lot 5 
This Brief first alerts this Court to the fact that The View Condominium Owners 
Association, which the Appellant purports to be, was involuntarily dissolved more than a 
decade ago and therefore may have lacked standing before the District Court. 
Turning to the substance of the View's claims, the District Court correctly determined 
that the CC&Rs, as amended by the Amended Plat, extinguished all rights that the View may 
have had in Old Lot 5. The Brief goes on to show that even if the parking designation for 
Old Lot 5 had not been terminated by the Amended Plant, the parking right applied to a 
portion of the View's own New Lot 8, not MSICO's New Lot 5. 
The factual record underpinning all these showings is absolutely uncontroverted by 
anything the View presented to the District Court. And, as the District Court understood, 
the law governing these issues aligns squarely with the interests of MSICO and Alta. 
Accordingly, the District Court's disposition of the cross-motions for summary judgment was 
"correct" under the applicable standard of appellate review and must be affirmed by this 
Court. 
B. With Respect To The View's Claim To A 
Right To Use New Lot 9 As A Snow Dump 
Undisputed facts presented to the District Court proved that SRC (MSICO's 
predecessor-in-title) designated New Lot 9 as a site for excess snow disposal to allow the 
construction on the initial Sugarplum phases to proceed and that that snow storage use 
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was not permanent. There was never a dedication of, or easement over New Lot 9 setting 
it aside as the snow disposal site for the View. 
Addressing the estoppel claims, the Brief shows that the View failed utterly to 
present evidence to the District Court that MSICO or Alta deluded any of The View 
Condominium unit owners into relying on the availability of New Lot 9 as a permanent 
snow storage site. The evidence before the District Court supported the position that 
SRC always intended to build residential units on New Lot 9. Similarly, the Brief 
demonstrates that the View failed to put on any evidence, as Utah law requires, that 
Alta's approval of a new snow storage plan worked a "manifest injustice" on the View. 
Turning to the View's claim that the termination of the use of New Lot 9 for snow 
storage worked a "taking" without just compensation, the Brief shows that, as a matter of 
law, the View does no have the type of "protectable property interest" that is subject to a 
taking by a municipality. Rather, the best the View could hope to show was a unilateral -
though irrational - expectation that New Lot 9 would always be there as a vacant snow 
dump. This showing, even if it had been made, does not pass muster under Utah law and 
dooms the View's contention on appeal. It follows, then, that the District Court's grant 
of summary judgment in favor of MSICO on this issue was "correct" under the applicable 
standard of appellate review and must be affirmed by this Court. 
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V. ARGUMENT 
A, The View Lacks Standing to Assert 
Claims Against MSICO or Alta 
As a preliminary matter, the Appellees are compelled to alert the Court to an 
adjudicative fact concerning the standing of the View. In its Complaint, the View 
maintains that it is The View Condominium Owners Association and that, in that 
capacity, it holds the ownership interest in New Lot 8. (R. 1-15, pp. 1,2.) MSICO (in its 
February 22, 2001 Answer and Counterclaim (R. 57,60.)) and Alta (in its February 6, 
2002 Answer, (R. 324, 327.)), each denied these allegations and pled affirmatively that 
the View lacked the standing necessary to assert any of its claims. The official records of 
the Utah Department of Commerce indicate that the View Condominium Owners 
Association was involuntarily dissolved as a Utah non-profit corporation in March 1988 
and never was reinstated.5 The dissolution of the Owners Association terminated its 
corporate life, MacKay v. Knobel, 23 Utah 2d 200, 203; 460 P.2d 828, 829 (1969), and 
barred it from commencing any proceedings in the courts more than two years after the 
date of its dissolution. Utah Code Ann. §16-10-100 (1984) (repealed 1992). Accordingly 
the District Court appears to have lacked subject matter jurisdiction over all claims 
5
 Addendum, Exhibit 2, is a true and correct copy of the official record of the Utah 
Department of Commerce that reflects the fact of the Owners Association's dissolution. 
Under Article 3 of the Utah Business Corporation Act which was then in effect, the 
Owners Association had one year from the date of its dissolution to be reinstated upon 
application and the payment of past due taxes and applicable reinstatement fees and 
penalties. See Utah Code Ann. §16-10-88.2(5) (1987) (repealed 1992); see also Utah 
Code Ann. §16-10-100 (1984) (repealed 1992). 
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presented in the View's Complaint. The appellees move this Court to take judicial notice 
of this official record and the View's Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and 
Restrictions pursuant to Utah Rule of Evidence 201(f). See International Broth, of 
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, and Helpers of America v. Zantop Air Transport 
Corp., 394 F.2d 36 (6th Cir. 1968) (While an appellate court is not obligated to take notice 
of matters not brought to the attention of the lower court, it may take judicial notice 
where necessary to affirm or to show the impropriety of the decision of the lower court).6 
Another jurisdictional question also merits attention: the View's claim of being 
"successor in title" to the Partnership, the purchaser of Lot 8 from SRC under a Deed 
dated January 4, 1985. (R. 417-18). Assuming it was not involuntarily dissolved in 
March 1988, the View is a Utah non-profit corporation established January 21, 1986 by 
the View Declaration. While the Utah Condominium Ownership Act,. §§57-8-1 through 
37, confers certain rights and obligations on the View, nothing in Utah law and certainly 
no conveyance in the Record gave it the status of successor to, or third-party beneficiary 
of, any interest or prior owner may have held in any Sugarplum Lot or any of The View 
Condominium units. If the prior owner never conveyed any sticks in its bundle of rights 
to the View, its standing before this Court deserves scrutiny even though this issue was 
6
 Where the reasoning of a federal case interpreting or applying a federal 
evidentiary rule is cogent and logical, the Utah appellate courts may freely look to that 
case, absent a Utah case directly on point, when interpreting or applying an analogous 
Utah evidentiary rule. State v. Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67 n.l, 52 P.3d 1194; Langelandv. 
Monarch Motors, Inc., 952 P.2d 1058, 1062 n. 4 (Utah 1998). 
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not considered by Judge Burton below. 
B. The Trial Court Correctly Concluded That, 
As A Matter of Law, The View Has No Right 
to A Parking Facility On New Lot 5 
1. The View Has No Right To A Parking 
Facility Under The CC&Rs As Amended. 
MSICO has never disputed that the Plat and the CC&Rs provided for residential 
units and the possibility of a "parking facility" on Old Lot 5. Indeed, the Plat's legend 
refers to Old Lot 5 as a site for "development of parking and commercial development of 
air space." (R. 419.) However, the Amended Plat (R. 420), which was recorded in 
November 1984, more than eighteen months before The View Condominium was 
established, deleted all references to New Lot 5 as the site for "parking and commercial 
development" and by that deletion terminated the View's right to establish a parking 
facility on New Lot 5. (R. 428, p. 16.) 
The reasons for these fundamental changes in the planned use of New Lot 5 were 
explained by Walter Plumb, a lawyer and SRC's former secretary. In his deposition 
testimony of January 29, 2002, Plumb stated that SRC had decided not to reserve New 
Lot 5 as the site of a large commercial building with underground parking and that the 
Amended Plat was intended to memorialize that decision (R. 428-29). Thus the Amended 
Plat had the purpose and legal effect of amending the CC&Rs, (R. 430, pp.30-31), of 
which it is an integral part. (R. 367 §1.19; 420). 
SRC's revisiting of the master development plan for Sugarplum was contemplated 
-16-
by the CC&Rs and was executed consistent with the CC&Rs' terms. CC&R Section 13.2 
gave SRC the "sole authority at any time to amend this Declaration, and the [Plat], if 
necessary, for the purpose of allocating density to Lots owned by [SRC] or changing the 
configuration, size or location of Lots owned by [SRC], in accordance with Subsections 
2.12 and 2.14 hereof." (R. 412) The term "Lots"is defined in CC&R Section 2.1.2 and 
includes the provision that "All such changes to the number, size or location of any Lot 
shall be effected by a modification of the Map." (R. 369) The "Map" was defined as 
"that subdivision map or P. U. D. plat entitled "Sugarplum, a Planned Unit Development" 
filed concurrently herewith . . . as the same may be amended from time to time and which 
is incorporated herein by this reference." (R. 367, §1.19.) These CC&R Sections make 
clear that changes to the placement and characteristics of the Lots were anticipated and 
that those revisions were to be incorporated in amendments to the Plat. 
The View's entire argument before the District Court and in its Brief on appeal 
ignores the "amendability" of CC&Rs and the reality that the Amended Plat effected on 
the entire Sugarplum development. The View recites the text of discrete portions of the 
CC&Rs with abandon but is deliberately silent on the critical fact that the "Lots" referred 
to in the Plat are far different than those identified in the Amended Plat - including the 
View's New Lot 8 and MSICO's New Lot 5. For example (and as the Overlay Exhibit 
shows clearly) Old Lot 5 was adjacent to Old Lots 7, 8 and 9, while New Lot 5 does not 
abut these parcels and is now separated from all of them by the Blackjack Road. The 
View's refusal to harmonize the Amended Plat with the text of the CC&Rs leads it to 
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distort the current array of Lots in order to revive a use for Old Lot 5 that SRC abandoned 
nearly two months before selling New Lot 8 to the Partnership and eighteen months 
before the Partnership created The View Condominium. If this Court accepts the View's 
reading of the Amended Plat out of the CC&Rs, then it must rule that (again, as the 
Overlay Exhibit shows) that the View already has the parking facility it seeks on its own 
New Lot 8 - literally in The View Condominium's back yard. 
A court "should not lightly assume that [covenants] could be imposed on adjoining 
property [outside the subdivision] without a clear expression of intent by the owner to do 
so." Dansie v. Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Assoc., 987 P.2d 30, 34 (Utah 1999). 
Here, there is no evidence that the use projected for Old Lot 5 in the CC&Rs was 
intended to attach arbitrarily to another parcel. As a matter of settled Utah law, the View 
has no basis to impose an abandoned use designation of Old Lot 5 on any other Lot. 
2. The Intent Of The Grantor Of New Lot 8 Was 
Not To Reserve A Parking Area On New Lot 5 
The main objective in construing a deed to real property is to ascertain the 
intention of the parties to the transfer, especially that of the deed's grantor. Where the 
instruments conveying title conflict, all the circumstances of the transfer must be 
considered. Clotworthy v. Clyde, 265 P.2d 420 (Utah 1954); accord Russell v. Geyser-
Marion Gold Mining Co., 423 P.2d. 487, 490 (Utah 1967) ("Because the paramount rule 
in interpreting an ambiguous deed is to determine the intent of the parties, it [is] proper 
for the trial court to consider extrinsic evidence in interpreting the . . . deed.") To prevail 
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on its claim that the District Court ruled incorrectly on its own and MISCO's opposing 
summary judgment motions, the View must point to evidence in the Record showing that 
when SRC conveyed New Lot 8 to the Partnership in January 1985, it also intended to 
convey an interest in New Lot 5 for the siting of a parking facility. But to accomplish 
this task, the View must show that the Amended Plat (R. 420) and the January 1985 
Special Warranty Deed (R.417-18) conveying New Lot 8 from SRC to the Partnership 
mean the opposite of what the text of each plainly states. The Special Warranty Deed 
incorporates both the Plat and the Amended Plat in its legal description of New Lot 8. 
These descriptions must be harmonized to discern the intent of SRC, the grantor. Saterlie 
v. Lineberry, 962 P.2d 863, 864 (Wash. App. 1998). 
The Amended Plat changed the Plat's configuration of Sugarplum and the 
Partnership received New Lot 8 (as described in the Amended Plat) from SRC, not Old 
Lot 8 (as described in the Plat). The intent of SRC in amending the Plat and conveying 
New Lot 8 to the Partnership was to reconfigure the Lots so that New Lot 5 could have 
unit density and remove the need to designate New Lot 5 as a parking area.(R. 428-30) A 
rational reconciliation of the two documents demands that the Amended Plat be viewed as 
superseding the Plat, thereby amending the CC&Rs. If, as the View contends, the array 
of Lots that appears in the Plat trumps that shown in the Amended Plat, then it must 
concede that part of The View Condominium building is located not on New Lot 8, but 
on Old Lot 5 - property not deeded to The View Condominium by the Partnership under 
the View Declaration. Furthermore, The View Condominium has at least 21 residential 
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units, one more than the number allocated to Old Lot 8 in the CC&Rs and the Plat. The 
Amended Plat, however, allocates 60 units to New Lots 8 and 9 combined. (R. 420.) If 
the construction of The View Condominium's 21 units on New Lot 8 is governed by the 
Amended Plat's schedule of unit density, on what rational basis can the View argue that 
the terms of the same schedule do not govern the use of New Lot 5? Without question, 
the View, by its own actions, has conceded that the Amended Plat controls the 
development of Sugarplum. It is therefore disingenuous of the View to take the 
contradictory position in the District Court and in this Court. 
The View's reliance on Claremont Property Owners Association v. Gilboy, 542 
SE.2d 324 (N.C. App. 2001) for the proposition that the terms of the unamended CC&Rs 
govern the disposition of this issue is completely misplaced. Indeed, the fundamental rule 
of law in Gilboy, which is glossed over in the View's Brief, underscores the correctness 
of the District Court's ruling in this matter. 
Gil boy concerned a dispute between the owner of two adjacent lots in a 
subdivision that was subject to a set of protective covenants. The owner combined his 
parcels into one and argued that his combined property was subject to one, not two 
assessments for road maintenance. The trial court determined that the combined parcel 
remained subject to the terms of the protective covenants as those parcels were situated at 
the time the covenants went into effect. 
In affirming the lower court ruling, the North Carolina Court of Appeals stated the 
governing principle as follows: 
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the servitudes imposed by the restrictive covenants of a subdivision attach 
to each individual lot at the moment the subdivision becomes subject to the 
covenants. This may occur upon the execution of the covenants if the 
subdivision is already complete, or, as in the instant case, it may occur upon 
the filing of a new plat of lots if the plat is intended to be subject to 
covenants already in existence. 
Gilboy, 542 S.E. 2d at 328 (citing Ingle v. Stubbins, 82 S.E.2d388 (N.C. 1953) (Emphasis 
added.) 
Here, the Amended Plat was not "intended to be subject to the [CC&Rs] already in 
existence." To the contrary, its very purpose was to amend the CC&Rs, of which it was 
an integral part (R. 367, § 1.19.), with respect to Lot unit density, location, spatial 
relationship, and use. The District Court recognized both the purpose and effect of the 
Amended Plat and therefore concluded that its terms, which were incorporated in SRC's 
deed of New Lot 8 to the Partnership, governed the interpretation of the CC&Rs.(R. 603-
04.) By its actions "on the ground," the View already has conceded that the Amended 
Plat modified the CC&Rs in just these respects. After all, The View Condominium 
contains at least 21 units, a density that would have violated the terms of the Plat but that 
is allowed under the Amended Plat. 
Plats recorded with condominium declarations are enforceable. Rowley v. 
Marrcrest Homeowners View, 656 P.2d 414 (Utah 1982) (plat containing legends 
concerning parking areas were enforceable). As defined in the Amended Plat, New Lot 5 
is designated as the site, in conjunction with New Lot 4, for the development of 65 
residential units. It is not reserved for any other purpose or for the benefit of any other 
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Lot. Because they were incorporated in SRC's January 1985 Special Warranty Deed to 
the Partnership, the terms of the Amended Plat are enforceable against both the 
Partnership and the View. Those terms provide abundant support for the District Court's 
ruling rejecting the View's claim to an interest in New Lot 5 but also granting summary 
judgment to MSICO on that claim. 
In addition to the text and chronology of the Amended Plat and the Special 
Warranty Deed, the testimony of Walter Plumb confirms that SRC intended the 
amendment of the Plat to, among other things, eliminate a parking facility on New Lot 5 
and did not intend to convey to the Partnership any easement or other right for a parking 
facility on New Lot 5. Nothing in the Record contradicts Plumb's sworn testimony that 
SRC intended the Amended Plat to govern the description of the property and related 
interests conveyed to the Partnership. Plumb's statement is endorsed without reservation 
by Russell Watts, an officer of the Partnership at the time of its January 1985 purchase of 
New Lot 8 from SRC. In his affidavit (R. 579-81.), Watts declares that the Partnership 
acquired no "parking right" from SRC. In the District Court the View failed to come 
forward with any facts controverting the testimony of Mr. Plumb, the authorized agent of 
the seller of New Lot 8, or the affidavit of Mr. Watts, the authorized officer of the buyer 
of New Lot 8. "Conduct by property owners within a development. . . may terminate 
and render unenforceable a particular covenant where such conduct so substantially 
changes the character of the neighborhood as to neutralize the benefit of the covenant, or 
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constitutes evidence of the abandonment of the covenant." Swenson v. Erickson, 2000 UT 
16, f21, 998 P.2d 807, 813 (citations omitted). The unrebutted statements of Plumb and 
Watts show conclusively that both parties to SRC's January 1985 sale of New Lot 8 to 
the Partnership intended to abandon any reservation of New Lot 5 as the site of a parking 
facility and to remove all restrictions on New Lot 5 as the site of development of 
residential units. The testimony of Plumb and Watts closes the door on the View's 
argument that New Lot 5 remains set aside as a parking lot for The View Condominium.7 
To the contrary, New Lot 5, as defined in the Amended Plat, is free of all interests the 
View may assert under the CC&Rs. Accordingly, the District Court correctly ruled that 
the View's asserted claim on this MSICO property fails as a matter of law. 
3. The View Has No Parking Right On New Lot 5 
The View attempts to skirt the fact that the location of its parking lot on New Lot 8 
is the very land (then known as Old Lot 5) described in the Plat as the site of its 
prospective parking facility. The View contends that because the CC&Rs lack a metes 
and bounds description defining Old Lot 5, its parking facility attaches to whichever 
Sugarplum parcel may later bear the numerical designation "5." That argument fails 
because the exact boundaries of Old Lot 5 were set out in the Plat, which was 
incorporated by reference in the CC&Rs. 
7
 The View does not cite to any place in the record where the credibility of those 
witnesses was challenged. 
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The View is trying impose a restrictive covenant affecting Old Lot 5 on New Lot 
5. But the rule in Dansie v. Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Assoc, 987 P.2d 30, 34 
(Utah 1999), cited by the View, prohibits precisely the type of creeping restrictive 
covenant the View contends for. In Dansie, the Utah Supreme Court held that a 
restrictive covenant affecting one parcel cannot be applied to adjacent property absent a 
clear expression of the adjacent property owner to have it do so. The covenant for an 
undefined parking facility applied to a portion of Old Lot 5—not the entire Sugarplum 
development. Because MSICO has never agreed to allow the View's parking facility on 
its property, there is no basis in law for the View to insinuate a restrictive covenant on 
New Lot 5 to bring about that result. 
Even if the View's assertion of an interest in New Lot 5 were contemplated under 
the reconfigured Lot scheme reflected in the Amended Plat, any right the View may have 
had to impose a restrictive covenant on property beyond New Lot 8 is now stale and 
therefore extinguished. Covenants that run with the land may become unenforceable. Fink 
v. Miller, 896 P.2d 649, 652 (Utah App. 1995). Here the intent of the CC&Rs was to 
protect the "great natural beauty" of the Project "through the use of a coordinated plan of 
development..." and for the "preservation of the value and appearance of the Project. . . 
." (R. 363). That "coordinated development" changed from large buildings like Snowbird 
to buildings with a lower profile that blended into their natural setting. (R. 428, pp. 14-
15). As the architectural scheme of Sugarplum evolved, the need for a parking facility on 
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Old Lot 5 became obsolete as parking was planned for and incorporated in each 
Sugarplum phase. In Fink, this Court affirmed the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the homeowner-defendant, stating that, as a matter of law, a 
restrictive covenant mandating the use of wooden shingles in a subdivision was 
abandoned and was unenforceable because no benefit would be achieved by enforcing 
that covenant that had been largely ignored for years. Fink, 896 P.2d at 654. Here, with 
the reconfigured Lots and the accommodations for adequate parking that have been 
provided in each phase of development, the use of Old Lot 5 as a parking facility, a 
demand that was not asserted for almost 20 years before this case, is abandoned and 
unenforceable as a matter of law as determined by Judge Burton. 
4. The View Already Has The Easement And 
Right-Of-Wav It May Claim Under The CC&Rs 
The bulk of the View's brief on appeal offers a slanted primer on the existence, 
meaning, and effects of various provisions of the CC&Rs. But missing from the View's 
tutorial on the operation of restrictive covenants and its meandering tour of the CC&Rs is 
any mention of the View Declaration, a document that, standing alone, proves as a matter 
of law that the View holds no interest whatsoever in New Lot 5, because it already holds 
property rights for a parking easement on a parcel that straddles Lot 6 and the Sugarplum 
common area. 
The revelation of the View's questionable legal status lead to examination of the 
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View's organization documents. Neither of these issues was developed before the 
District Court, but both go to the core question of whether the View has standing and 
whether it sued the proper defendant on its claims to an interest in an off-site parking 
structure. 
In its opening recital, the View Declaration describes the real property "parcels" 
that were dedicated to The View condominium project in June 1986. These include 
"Parcel 3", a "perpetual easement and right of way for a parking area and/or parking 
structure" which the View Declaration goes on to define by metes and bounds 
description. When the View Declaration's characterization of Parcel 3 is coupled with a 
plotting of Parcel 3 on a Sugarplum survey map, two facts emerge: (1) to the extent that 
the CC&Rs could be read to reserve an easement for off-site parking for the benefit of 
New Lot 8, the obligation to provide that easement has been satisfied by the dedication of 
Parcel 3,8 and (2) that easement lies on land that was part of Old Lot 5 in the Plat but 
which, in the Amended Plat, straddles the boundary between the Sugarplum common area 
and New Lot 6. New Lot 6 is not owned by MSICO or the appellant; thus it appears that 
the View has sued the wrong Sugarplum landowner to enforce its interest in a parking 
structure. A certified copy of the View Declaration, as recorded by the Partnership 
8
 The Appellees respectfully suggest that each deed from the Partnership to the 
original owner of each unit in The View Condominium contains an identical conveyance 
of an interest in Parcel 3. See, for example, Warranty Deed dated June 3, 1988 from the 
Partnership to Vladimir Kovacevic, as recorded by the Partnership June 3, 1988, as Entry 
4633194, in Book 6035 at pages 1940 throughl941 of the Official Records of Salt Lake 
County. 
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January 21, 1986, as Entry 4191670, in Book 5729 at pages 1310 throughl381, of the 
Official Records of Salt Lake County, is attached at Exhibit 3 of the Addendum to this 
Brief. The Appellees move this Court to take judicial notice of this official record 
pursuant to Utah Rule of Evidence 201(f). See International Broth, of Teamsters, 
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, and Helpers of America v. Zantop Air Transport Corp., 394 
F.2d 36 (6th Cir. 1968) (While an appellate court is not obligated to take notice of matters 
not brought to the attention of the lower court, it may take judicial notice where necessary 
to affirm or to show the impropriety of the decision of the lower court). 
The View failed to tell the District Court about its legal status, the dedication of 
and the fixed location of "Parcel 3" next to New Lot 8. Instead, the View searched for 
whatever Sugarplum parcel was tagged "Lot 5" in the Amended Plat and through this 
lawsuit demanded a parking right on that property (which MSICO bought in December 
1988). The View's analysis of which Lot would host its parking facility easement (and, 
correspondingly, which Lot owner it would sue in this action) is rooted in the unfounded 
assumption that the Lot designated "5" in Amended Plat corresponds in some fashion to 
the Lot with that number in the Plat.9 The View's exaltation of an arbitrary numerical 
Lot designation over the Partnership's forward-looking reservation of Parcel 3 as a 
parking easement has led the View to stake its parking facility claim on property 
9
 It also reveals that while the legal context may be couched in terms of 
easements, rights and structures, the View's real aim is to thwart development near The 
View Condominium's desirable location between two world-class ski areas or at least 
keep its snow removal expenses below market by using someone else's land for its waste. 
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separated from New Lot 8 by a road rather than the property the Partnership chose 
immediately adjacent to New Lot 8. Though the View's election to chase "Lot 5" up the 
slopes of Sugarplum may give new meaning to an easement "running with the land," 
nothing in the Record supports the absurd premise from which the View's claim to an 
interest in New Lot 5 arises.10 Rather, the View Declaration demonstrates that the View's 
parking right was attached to a fixed location in Sugarplum no later than 1986 and that 
that location is on New Lot 6, not New Lot 5. For this reason alone, this Court should 
affirm the District Court's ruling that the View's claim to an easement on New Lot 5 fails 
as a matter of law. 
C. The Trial Court Correctly Concluded That As A Matter of Law, The View 
Has No Right to Use New Lot 9 As A Snow Dump 
1. The View Has No Contract With 
Alta To Store Snow On New Lot 9 
Assuming solely for purposes of this appeal that the View is the corporate heir to 
the Partnership's municipal permits, forms of understandings or arrangements with third 
parties, the fact remains that no doctrine in contract law will support its claim to a 
preemptive right to use New Lot 9 as a dump for excess snow that accumulates on Lot 8. 
The single thread the View traces to tie its alleged interest in New Lot 9 to contract law 
10
 Of course, unless the District Court's rejection of the View's argument on this 
issue is affirmed by this Court, the View will be left with parking rights on New Lot 5 
(MSICO's property), New Lot 8 (its own property), New Lot 6 (property of yet another 
Sugarplum condominium), and the Sugarplum common area. 
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springs from correspondence from SRC to Alta in early 1985. At that time, Alta was 
deliberating upon how the development of early Phases of Sugarplmn would proceed. In 
its written "Recommendations per February 4, 1985," Alta's Technical Review 
Committee concluded that SRC's "snow removal and storage plan was inadequate in that, 
among other matters, it failed to provide for excess snow storage on-site, i.e., on the 
Sugarplum premises. (R. 520.) To address Alta's concerns, SRC's Secretary, Walter J. 
Plumb, Jr. wrote the following letter (R. 431.) to the Alta Planning Commission on 
February 27, 1985: 
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The provisional snow storage arrangements set out in Walter Plumb's February 27, 
1985 letter proved satisfactory to Alta and, by letter dated March 3, 1985, John H. 
Guldner, the Alta Town Administrator, advised SRC that development of Sugarplum's 
first 100 units could go forward. (R. 514.) 
It is solely in this mundane (and fleeting) instance of the town of Alta exercising 
its statutorily-granted powers to regulate land use11 that the View finds all the essential 
elements of a contract containing rights it may enforce against Alta. But imposing 
conventional contract analysis on the administrative process by which Alta approved the 
development of Sugarplum's Phase 1 yields only nonsense. Where, for example, is the 
consideration the town received from SRC's temporary designation of New Lot 9 for 
snow storage? "A generally accepted definition of consideration is that a legal detriment 
has been bargained for and exchanged for a promise." Dementas v. Estate ofTallas. 764 
P.2d 628, 632 (Utah App. 1988). Indeed, if the View's characterization of the SRC-Alta 
relationship were accurate, Alta would have to pursue an action for breach of contract, 
most likely one for specific performance, had SRC or the view violated the town's 
ordinances regulating snow removal and storage. That result is absurd as it extinguishes 
the police power on which all Utah municipalities rely to establish and enforce 
ordinances or regulation governing land use. In truth, Alta never entered into a contract 
with SRC in 1985 to govern snow control at Sugarplum; instead, it invoked its police 
11
 See Utah Code Ann. §10-8-84. 
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power, as would any Utah municipality, to safeguard the health, safety, and welfare of its 
residents. 
To prop up its characterization of SRC's proposal to temporarily commit Lot 9 to 
storage of excess snow as a contract of perpetual duration (and one that it may enforce), 
the View refers the Court to comments by John Guldner, Alta's Administrator, in a 1999 
public hearing long after any "contract" would have arisen. On that occasion Mr. 
Guldner stated that New Lot 9 was "designated and given up to snow storage."12 But Mr. 
Guldner's remarks should not be misconstrued. The undisputed facts show that in sworn 
testimony Mr. Guldner also said that "Walt Plumb gave New Lot 9 away, at least 
temporarily, for snow removal and snow storage purposes in order for Lot 8 to be 
developed . . . . He gave that away until such time as an alternative snow removal plan 
could be worked out by the developer on the developer's own land and not crossing the 
bypass road." (R. 569-70.) Mr. Guldner's sworn statements on New Lot 9's transitory 
designation as a snow storage area agree precisely with the Partnership's understanding 
of that matter at the time of its January 1985 purchase of New Lot 8 from SRC. In an 
affidavit of record in this case, (R. 579-81), Russell K. Watts, the Partnership's 
representative in the purchase negotiations, declares that: 
12
 Brief of Appellant, p. 28, citing R. 510. What the View calls "testimony" was 
actually only a comment by Mr. Guldner in a public meeting where the speakers were not 
under oath. Alta and MSICO have never disputed Mr. Guldner's personal remarks though 
they note that the personal statements of a municipal employee or elected official are 
immaterial. The law is well settled that the ministerial acts of municipal employees are 
not binding. Town of Alta v. Ben Hame, 836 P.2d 797, 801 (Utah App. 1992). 
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With respect to snow storage and removal plans submitted in connection 
with the development approvals of Lot 8 in 1985, my understanding was 
that the designation of the adjacent Lot 9 for a snow storage area was 
temporary and subject to change. I never understood that Lot 9 would be 
permanently vacant or non-developable. 
The View offered no facts disputing Mr. Watts' affidavit. 
2. Alta Is Not Estopped To Allow MSICO To 
Develop New Lot 9 In A Manner That Precludes 
The View's Use of That Parcel As A Snow Dump 
The View next assigns error to the District Court's ruling that Alta is not equitably 
estopped from approving development of Lot 9 that will end its use as a vacant snow 
dump for new Lot 8. Specifically, the View takes issue with the Court's determination 
that there is no evidence that the View changed positions due to, or reasonably relied on, 
the historical practice of depositing snow on New Lot 9 to its financial detriment. 
(Appellant's Brief at p. 29-30 and R. 591). The View identifies no evidence from unit 
owners or others who reasonably relied on statements or actions of Alta in connection 
with a purchase of their units at the View. 
Under Utah law a private entity may assert equitable estoppel against a 
municipality, but only "if necessary to prevent manifest injustice, and the exercise of 
governmental powers will not be impaired as a result. . . ." Celebrity Club v. Utah Liquor 
Control Comm'n., 602 P.2d 689, 694 (Utah 1979). As the Utah Supreme Court has 
observed, estoppel is: 
a doctrine of equity purposed to rescue from loss a party who has, without 
fault, been deluded into a course of action by the wrong or neglect of 
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another. . . . Estoppel arises when a party . . . by his acts, representations, or 
admissions, or by his silence when he ought to speak, intentionally or 
through culpable negligence, induces another . . . to believe certain facts to 
exist and that such other . . . acting with reasonable prudence and diligence, 
relies and acts thereon so that he will suffer an injustice if the former . . . . is 
permitted to deny the existence of such facts. 
Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1976). 
The View's invocation of the doctrine of estoppel is misguided for several reasons. 
First, the Record contains no evidence that Alta acted wrongfully or negligently in March 
1985 when it approved SRC's proposal to temporarily use New Lot 9 as a disposal site 
for excess snow. Alta accepted the plan only when SRC demonstrated that it was 
consistent with the town's ordinances requiring a snow removal plan. Where the taint lies 
in this prudent application and enforcement of the town's regulatory scheme for snow 
management the View does not say and the Record does not disclose. Nor has the View 
marshaled facts supporting its argument that Alta's approval of a revised snow storage 
plan in 2000 was wrongful or negligent. The revisions accepted by Alta simply tracked a 
change in the Utah Department of Transportation's policy on crossing the Bypass Road 
with plowed snow13 and the lower unit density on New Lots 4, 5 and 9. These 
possibilities were contemplated in Walter Plumb's February 1985 letter. 
Second, the View failed to point the District Court to any evidence that Alta 
"deluded" the View into concluding that New Lot 9 was dedicated in perpetuity as a 
13
 UDOT approved the practice in May 2000 (R. 583.) Its earlier prohibition (and 
Alta's insistence that Sugarplum utilize on-site snow storage) is reflected in the official 
records of Alta's Technical Review Committee. See R. 520. 
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snow dump for the benefit of The View Condominium's residents. The uncontested 
evidence in the Record makes plain that Alta approved SRC's provisional use of New Lot 
9 (and thereafter issued a Conditional Use Permit to SRC to develop Lots 6 and 8) in 
March 1985, more than eighteen months before the View came into existence. (Compare 
R. 519 and View Declaration, p. 1.) Any prospective purchaser of a unit at The View 
Condominium who reviewed the Alta public records could only have concluded that the 
Plumb letter did not perpetually dedicate New Lot 9 as a snow dump and did not bar the 
town from considering alternative snow removal and storage plan, not involving New Lot 
9, as circumstances (such as a change in UDOT policy) allowed. 
The Record is devoid of evidence that any member of the View, that is, any unit 
owner of The View Condominium, incurred "extensive expenses" or changed a 
"substantial position" as a result of Alta's "wrong or neglect." As the View will concede, 
it submitted no documentary or testimonial evidence in the summary judgment 
proceedings before the District Court to create even the shadow of an issue of material 
fact on this point.14 And as the View also must acknowledge, it now has the benefit of a 
municipally-approved snow removal plan that makes no use whatsoever of New Lot 9. 
14
 The View did cite Alta Planning Commission Resolution 1999-PC-R-l as 
evidence of an issue of triable fact concerning the permanency of New Lot 9's designation 
as a snow depository. Brief of Appellant, p. 11 (citing R. 506-07.) But the text of that 
administrative record is unequivocally opposed to the View's position on appeal. It 
provides in relevant part, "Lot 9 was committed for snow storage until such time as other 
adequate snow storage areas are provided on site" (R. 507.) (Emphasis added.) 
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3. There Is No Evidence In The Record 
Of A "Taking" Of The View's Property 
The View contends that Alta's "removal" of New Lot's 9 designation as a 
permanent snow-storage facility effects a taking of private property for a public use 
without just compensation. Brief of Appellant, pp. 30-31. The View has never made it 
clear whether the action of Alta which it challenges works a taking on its asserted interest 
in New Lot 8, the site of The View, or New Lot 9, property owned by MSICO but in 
which the View asserts a claim to use as a snow dump. However, based on the 
undisputed facts in the record and governing Utah law, the View's takings claim fails 
with respect to both parcels and summary judgment was proper. 
The View maintains that the alleged "removal" of New Lot's 9 designation as a 
snow-dump was brought about by the execution of the November 24, 2000 Definitive 
Agreement by Alta and MSICO. In Section 2.4 of the Definitive Agreement, Alta and 
MSICO formally agreed that: 
any right to temporary or other use of Lot 9 for snow storage for the benefit of 
any other owners or occupants of property in the Sugarplum PUD (including 
any owners association) or for any other purpose shall terminate and be 
immediately and automatically terminated, and the provisions and expressions 
in that certain February 27, 1985 letter signed by Walter Plumb on behalf of 
Sorenson Resources Company to the Alta Planning Commission shall be of no 
further force or effect. 
(R. 441.) 
The View correctly observes that a taking of private property for which just 
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compensation is due must constitute a substantial interference with a protectable property 
interest that destroys or materially lessens the value of the property interest or by which the 
right to use and enjoy the property interest is in any substantial degree abridge or destroyed. 
Brief of Appellant, p. 31 (citing Strawberry Electric Service District v. Spanish Fork City, 
918 P.2d 870,877 (Utah 1996)). The rule in Strawberry Electric applies to property interests 
that arise under contract. Bagford v. Ephraim City. 904 P.2d 1095, 1099 (Utah 1995)). 
However, as the Utah Supreme Court has explained, "to create a protectable property 
interest, a contract must establish rights more substantial in nature than a mere unilateral 
expectation of continued rights or benefits . . . ." Bagford, 904 P.2d at 1099. "Absent an 
exclusive franchise or the equivalent thereof, no vested, legally enforceable interest arises, 
and consequently, there is no property that can provide the basis for compensation in an 
inverse condemnation proceeding." Bagford. 904 P.2d at 1099. 
The View was neither a party to, nor an intended beneficiary of, the March 1985 
arrangement between SRC and Alta designating New Lot 9 as a temporary snow repository. 
But assuming for purposes of this appeal that the View could assert either status, the question 
remains whether anything in the Record created more than an irrational, unilateral 
expectation that such use of New Lot 9 would continue indefinitely. As the Appellees' have 
shown in this Brief, SRC proposed and Alta approved construction on New Lot 8 with 
storage on New Lot 9 as a temporary accommodation while development of several 
Sugarplum parcels, New Lot 8 among them, proceeded. Because Sugarplum was to be 
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developed in phases with an impact study to be conducted following the construction of 100 
units, it was apparent to SRC in 1985 that New Lot 9 would be vacant while the earlier 
phases, including New Lot 8, were built. The need for a snow removal and storage plan that 
led to the designation of New Lot 9 as an interim snow repository flowed from Alta's 
requirement that excess snow be stored on-site and not plowed across the Bypass Road. (R. 
520.) Of course Alta was free to change this requirements specified by these ordinances 
through its established administrative procedures and could have done so at any time without 
consultation with, or special notice to, the View. Even if those ordinances remained 
unchanged, nothing in the arrangement between SRC and Alta contemplated New Lot 9f s use 
as a perpetual snow repository. Thus no formal dedication of New Lot 9 and no easement 
over that parcel was ever recorded (or even prepared). Nor were the CC&Rs amended to 
reflect New Lot 9fs supposed changed status as common area. The View's expectations for 
the continued use of New Lot 9 were unilateral, and because those expectations are 
irreconcilable with the evidence in the record of the transient nature of New Lot 9's 
designation, the View may not prevail on its claim that Alta effected a taking of New Lot 9. 
Similarly, the Record contains no evidence that the View's interest in the use or 
enjoyment of New Lot 8 was or would be abridged to any substantial degree or destroyed 
by any action on the part of Alta. The undisputed facts are that Alta approved a snow storage 
plan for the View's property that will maintain full use of the View's units even though New 
Lot 9 will be largely unavailable for snow storage. Thus, whether the View attaches its claim 
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to New Lot 8 or New Lot 9, the District Court correctly concluded that the View's taking 
claim failed as a matter of law. Such a result was clearly dictated by the holding in Bagford 
v. Ephraim City, 904 P.2d 1095 (Utah 1995). 
4. The District Court Correctly Concluded That As A Matter 
Of Law The View Has No Easement Over New Lot 9 
As with its takings claim, the View's assertion that it holds an easement over New Lot 
9 has been shot through with ambiguity both in the district court and this appeal. The View 
has never made plain whether its claim to an easement is intended to be a claim that there 
is an implied covenant in contract prohibiting MSICO's development of that parcel in any 
manner inconsistent with the View's use of it as a snow dump, or whether the assertion of 
an easement is an argument that New Lot 9 is burdened with an implied equitable servitude 
in favor of the View, but as it is shown immediately below, no matter which of these 
interpretations of an easement claim the View advances, the claim fails as a matter of law. 
(a) There Is No Implied Restrictive Covenant 
Even where restrictive covenants are expressly stated in a conveyance, they "are not 
favored in the law and are strictly construed in favor of the free and unrestricted use of 
property." St. Benedict's Devp. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp, 811 P.2d 194, 198 (Utah 1991) 
(citing cases). Thus, it is only under certain extreme circumstances that the law will 
recognize which is said to arise by implication from the language of the deed or lease, or 
from the conduct of the parties. St Benedict's Dev. Co., 811 P.2d at 198. 
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"In order for a restrictive covenant to be implied, the support from it must be 'plain 
and unmistakable' oritmustbe 'necessary' as a matter of law." St. Benedict's Dev. Co., 811 
P.2d at 198. In its Brief the View points this Court to no language, never mind "plain and 
unmistakable" language, in any of the materials on which it relies to support its claim of a 
restrictive covenant encumbering New Lot 9 for the benefit of the View. There is nothing 
in Walter Plumb's February 19, 1985 letter; nothing in the conditional use permit Alta 
granted SRC; and nothing in any administrative record of Alta that begins to imply the 
existence of any permanent restriction on MSICO's use and development of New Lot 9. 
Nor is there any necessity as a matter of law for the trial court or this Court to imply 
a covenant to carry out the intended purposes of any arrangement, whether by contract, letter, 
conditional use permit, or other form of understanding between SRC and Alta so as to allow 
those parties to realize the respective benefit of their mutual bargains. Alta's approval of the 
snow removal plan for New Lot 8 came about in March 1985 when SRC met Alta's 
requirements for temporary, on-site snow storage by impressing New Lot 9 into temporary 
service. That arrangement was terminated in November 2000 by the conditional use permit 
issued for New Lots 4, 5 and 9 in connection with the Definitive Agreement. And the 
Definitive Agreement itself, the only extant arrangement between MSICO, as SRC's 
successor in title to New Lot 9, and Alta, pertains exclusively, with the exception of Section 
2.4's cancellation of New Lot 9fs temporary snow storage duties, to development issues on 
MSICO's own property. The Definitive Agreement neither contemplates or needs a 
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restrictive covenant, either express or implied, in order to take full effect. It follows then, 
that there is no basis in law to support the View's demand for access to New Lot 9 based on 
the theory of implied restrictive covenant. 
(b) There Is No Equitable Servitude 
In Dansie v. Hi-Country Estates Homeowners View, 1999 UT 62, 987 P.2d 31, the 
Utah Supreme Court stated that an implied equitable servitude encumbers a parcel of real 
property when: 
1. A common owner subdivides property into a number of lots for sale; 
2. The common owner has a "general scheme of development" for the property 
as a whole in which the use of the property will be restricted; 
3. The vast majority of subdivided lots contain restrictive covenants which reflect 
the general scheme; 
4. The property against which application of an implied covenant is sought is part 
of the general scheme of development; and 
5. The purchaser of the lot in question has notice, actual or constructive, of the 
restriction. 
Dansie, 1999 UT 62,1f23, 987 P.2d at 35. 
Though the context in which an implied equitable servitude arises differs from that 
which yields an implied restrictive covenant, the test for the existence of an implied servitude 
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is the same as for a restrictive covenant. Cf St, Benedict's Dev, Co,, 811 P.2d at 198, and 
Dansie, 1999 UT 62 at ^[25; 987 P.2d at 36. Support for the servitude must be plain and 
unmistakable or the servitude must be necessary as a matter of law. St Benedict's Dev. Co,, 
811 P.2d at 198. In March 1985 Sugarplum agreed that New Lot 9 could serve as a 
temporary storage site for snow plowed from New Lots 6 and 8. SRC proposed this 
arrangement to Alta to gain the town's approval for construction of Sugarplum's first 100 
residential units. Just as it is undeniable that SRC agreed to allow New Lot 9 to serve as a 
repository for excess snow during development of Sugarplum, it is beyond question that that 
designation was temporary and would terminate, upon further approval of Alta, when 
alternative snow storage arrangements were settled and later phases constructed. Those 
arrangements, as explained above, were an integral part of the Definitive Agreement 
concluded by MSICO and Alta in November 2000. For the View to insist that SRC's 
agreement to set aside one of its Sugarplum parcels as a temporary snow storage site has 
evolved into a permanent, implied equitable servitude on New Lot 9 is to distort the factual 
record in this case beyond recognition and to disregard controlling decisional law on point. 
This Court must conclude that there is no plain or unmistakable basis in the record that 
supports the View's claim for an equitable servitude and that this issue was correctly decided 
by the District Court. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Court must affirm the rulings of the District Court denying the View's Motion 
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for Summary Judgment on its claim to a right to use New Lot 5 as a parking facility and 
granting the Motions for Summary Judgment of MSICO and Alta with respect to New Lot 
5 and with respect to New Lot 9. The court should award MSICO and Alta their costs on 
appeal pursuant to Rule 34 U.R.A.P. 
CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH 
William H. Christensen 
Lawrence R. Dingivan 
Attorneys for Appellees 
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DECLARATION OF CONDOMINIUM >
 r- , <~ 
OF THE ^ "*- / i>^  *^^  
THE VIEW CONDOMINIUM PROJECT
 w §£ ' • > w 
This Declaration of Condominium, hereinafter referred to as c^  
the "Declaration" is made and executed this 21st day of January, ^ 
1986, by The View Associates, Ltd., a Utah limited partnership, 
hereinafter referred to as the "Declarant*" ^* 
^ 
RECITALS: 
A. Description of Land, The Declarant is the owner of the 
following-described parcel of land, hereinafter referred to as the 
"Land," which is located in the County of Salt Lake, ka\e of 
Utah: 
Parcel 1: 
Lot 8, SUGARPLUM, a Planned Unit Development, as the 
same is identified in the Plat recorded November, 26, 
1984, as Entry No. 4019736, in Book 84-11 of Plats, at 
page 181, of Official Records, and in the Master 
Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions 
of SUGARPLUM, a Planned Unit Development, recorded 
August 12, 1983, as Entry No. 3830328, in Book 5482, at 
pages 1173 through 1230, of Official Records. 
Parcel 2: 
A portion of Lot 9 SUGARPLUM, a Planned Unit 
Development, as the same is identified in the Plat 
recorded November 26, 1984, as Entry No. 4019736, in 
Book 84-11 of Plats, at Page 181 of Official Records, 
and in the Master Declaration of Covenants, Conditions 
and Restrictions of SUGARPLUM, a Planned Unit £ 
Development, recorded August 12, 1983, as Entry No. "_ 
3830328, in Book 5482, at Page 1173 through 1230 of SJ 
Official Records. 
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Being more particularly described as follows: 
BEGINNING at a point which is South 315.40 feet and C^ 
East 710,1C feet from a 2 inch 3teel pipe placed in the £$ 
rock kerr. o£ Corner #2 of the Black Jack Mining Lode 
Claim, Survey #!>28S, said claim corner being located 
South 32 %13'19" W<*st 3377.23 :eet, more or less, from 
the Northeast corner of Section 6, Township 3 South, 
Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, said point 
of beginning being North 67"20"00" West 14.00 feet from 
the Southeast corner of Lot 8, SUGARPLUM PLAT, and 
running thence South 72*09'53" West 36.75 feet; thence 
North 38*28,02" West 49.44 feet; thence South 67*20'00M 
East 71.23 feet to the point of BEGINNING. 
Parcel 3: 
A Perpetual Easement and Right of Way for a parking 
area and/or parking structure being described as 
follows: 
BEGINNING at a point which is South 129.78 feet, East 
802.79 feet and South 22*40' West 22.00 feet from a 2 
inch steel pipe placed in the rock kern of Corner #2 of 
the Black Jack Mining Lode Claim, Survey #5288, said 
claim corner being located South 32*13'19" West 3377.23 
feet, more or less, from the Northeast corner of 
Section 6, Township 3 south, Range 3 East, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian; and running thence North 67*20' West 
49.00 feet; thence North 22*40* East 18.00 feet; thence 
South 67*20' East 49.00 feet; thence South 22*40' West 
18.00 feet to the point of BEGINNING. 
ALL PARCELS SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING: 
A Right of Way tor ingress and egress over and across a 
Portion of Lot 4 described as follows: 
Beginning at a point which is the Southwest Corner of 
Lot 4 and the Northwest Corner of Lot 5 of Sugarplum 
according to the official plat thereof as recorded in 
the office of the Salt Lake County Recorder as entry 
No. 4019736 in Book 84-11 at page 181 and running 
thence from the point of beginning N 22*20'00M W 31.47 
feet; thence N 22*40'00" E 154.70 feet; thence S 
67*20'00" E 22.25 feet; thence S 22*40'00M W 176.95 
feet to the point of beginning. This Right of Way is 
intended to provide property owners with use of an 
existing roadway that crosses a portion of lot 4. 
Together with a right and easement of use and enjoyment 
in and to the Common Areas and Facilities, as described 
in and provided for in the Plat and Master Declaration 
of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions of 
SUGARPLUM, a Planned Unit Development. 
Excepting all minerals in or under said parcels 
including, but not limited to, metals, oil, gas, coal, 
stone and mineral rights, mining rights, and easement 
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7.06 Insurance. The Association shall purchase and maintain 
insurance on behalf of any person who was or is a Trustee, 
officer, employee or agent of the Association, or who was or is 
serving at the request of the Association as a Trustee, director, 
officer, employee or agent of another corporation, entity or 
enterprise (whether for profit or not for profit), as may be 
required by Article X of the Declaration. 
7.07 Payments and Premiums. All indemnification payments 
made, and all insurance premiums for insurance maintained, 
pursuant to this article shall constitute expenses of the 
Association and shall be paid with funds from the Common Expense 
Fund referred to in the Declaration. 
ARTICLE VIII 
FISCAL YEAR AND SEAL 
8.01 Fiscal Year. The fiscal year of the Association shall 
begin on the first day of January each year and end on the 31st 
day of December next following, except that the first fiscal year 
shall begin on the date of incorporation. 
8.02 Seal. The Board of Trustees may by resolution provide 
a corporate seal which shall be circular in form and shall have 
inscribed thereon the name of the Association, the state of 
incorporation and the words "Corporate Seal". 
ARTICLE IX 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
9.01 Rules and Regulations. The Board of Trustees may from 
time to time adopt, amend, repeal and enforce reasonable rules and 
regulations governing the use and operation of the Project, to the 
extent that such rules and regulations are not inconsistent with 
the rights and duties set forth in the Articles of Incorporation, 
the Declaration or these Bylaws. The members shall be provided 
with copies of all rules and regulations adopted by the Board of 
Trustees and with copies of all amendments and revisions thereof. 
MBWPHBHT8 
10.01 Amendments. Except as otherwise provided by law, by 
the Articles of Incorporation, by the Declaration or by these 
Bylaws, these Bylaws may be amended, altered or repealed and new 
bylaws may be made and adopted by the members upon the affirmative 
vote of at least fifty-one percent (51%) of the Total Votes of the 
C-ll 
Association; provided, however, that such action shall not be 
effective unless and until a written instrument setting forth (i) 
the amended, altered, repealed or new bylaw, 'ii) the number of 
votes cast in favor of such action, and (iii) the Total Votes of 
the Association shall behave been executed and verified by the 
current President of the Association and recorded in the office of 
the County Recorder of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, constituting all of the 
Trustees of The View Condominium Owners' Association, Inc., have 
executed these Bylaws on the +^1/ day of /^ -xSJfcfcfcf^ /, 1986. 
Russell K. Watts 
[(//AAA*^~S 
CONSENT OF DECLARANT 
On this 2~( 5 day of J7fa-*^>~>—> 1986, the undersigned, The 
View Associates, Ltd., a Utah Limited Partnership, as the 
Declarant, does hereby consent to and execute these Bylaws in 
accordance with the provisions of the Utah Condominium Ownership 
Act. 
THE VIEW ASSOCIATES LTD., 
a Utah Limited Partnership 
By THE VIEW INC., 
a Utah Corporation 
President 
Secretary 
friKlfingi-ri 
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STATE OP UTAH ) 
: ss> 
COUNTY OP SALT A^KE ) 
Qrs the ^-\ day of ^fVMZJ * 19:6, personally appeared 
s
 •• *,?*« me , KtfVteJL-g , Wgg0CS_> *~ - ^>fcg<- M E b - a n d 
ftlCtfrteL 0 .•SnumosaJ > who being by a t T u I T sworn d i d s a v , that 
they are the members of tha Board of Trustees of The View 
Condominium Owners' Association, Inc . , and that the within and 
foregoing instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by 
authority of a resolution of i t s Board of Trustees, and said 
ten<s3 &, uvm» , , e*ras>€K~ K. UMTTS, and 
J l^flH-AgL- O. ?>a/ef£q/0 dulyac icnowU-agedto mi that fc^ey 
executed the same. ........»„.• w J a 
• -CT'^ 
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 5 
My commission expi e s : N^ tv-^ T y rIO"« / •*/ 
f s i l2 i IS£k_ _ . V./^ \ S/ 
C-13 
ss * 
uay of ^ ^ ^ ^ i r 1986, personally appeared 
STATE OF UT&B 
COUNTY OF SALT LAK& 
On thr. 
before r&e _ ^ 
by me duly" s^o 
hi\\£&? <&UU34frA are the President and Secret 
a Utah corporation* the general partner of The View Associates, 
Ltd., a Jtah limited partnership, and that the said instrument was 
sicned in behalf of said Corporation by authority of its Board of 
Directors, and said _ and _ _ _ , , 
duly acknowledged to me that the said corporation executed the 
same on behalf of The View Associates? j^td., a Utah limited 
partnership, 
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